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Photography is democratic: it puts into the hand of everyman the means to be his own 
recorder. To defend its artistic pretensions is to make everyman an artist.  
Roger Scruton, ‘The Photographic Surrogate’, 1989 p.178. 
 
 
According to Roger Scruton, it is not possible for photographs to be 
representational art.i To be a work of art, a photograph would have to 
sustain aesthetic interest in the photograph qua photograph. The only 
worthwhile potential for aesthetic interest of this kind, he believes, is if we 
could treat photographs as representational art; but, Scruton argues, the 
medium of photography is inherently disqualified from this role. 
 If we allow Scruton’s specification of the ‘ideal photograph’, along 
with his account of understanding representational art, then his argument is 
robust. Most responses to Scruton’s Scepticism are versions of the claim 
that Scruton disregards the extent to which intentionality features in 
photography – or, at least, in some kinds of photograph. Even if these 
responses offer appealing or compelling reasons to consider photography an 
art form, they do not shake Scruton’s position because they cannot force 
him to give up his notion of the ideal photograph. My approach is to argue 
that Scruton has misconstrued the role of causation in his discussion of 
photography. This exposes a flaw in his account of the ideal photograph 
and, moreover, a serious flaw in his account of how it is possible to take 
interest in an ideal photograph. I can highlight what is radical in my 
approach by the following suggestion: although Scruton insists that the ideal 
photograph is defined by its ‘merely causal’ provenance, in fact he fails to take 
the causal provenance of photographs seriously enough.  
In section 2, I examine Scruton’s specification of the ideal 
photograph and in section 3, his account of the interest that we can take in 
an ideal photograph. In these sections I argue that, by underestimating the 
causal provenance of photographs, Scruton has generated an inaccurate 
account of both the ‘subject’ of a photograph and the ‘medium’ of 
photography and this allows him to specify an overly restricted conception 
of how we might take interest in an ideal photograph. In section 4, I offer a 
substantive account of how we should understand the causal provenance of 
photographs. We must replace Scruton’s talk of the ‘medium’ with an 
accurate understanding of the photographic process, if we are to discuss the 
  
potential of photography to be a distinctive art form.ii On my account, 
Scruton’s ideal photograph does not count as a photograph at all. 
The present paper is not a rebuttal of Scruton’s overall sceptical 
stance – I don’t imagine that he will be moved to recant. Rather, I aim to 
expose some significant problems with the argument that he uses to justify 
his sceptical thesis and thus show that a new argument will be needed if he 
intends to defend that thesis. I am willing to admit that, strictly speaking, I 
offer a response to Scruton’s Sceptical Argument, rather than a response to 
Scruton’s Scepticism.  
 
(2) 
A painting is a painting of something and a photograph is a photograph of 
something. Scruton insists, rightly, that there is a fundamental difference 
between these cases, a difference that he explains by saying that a painting 
stands in an intentional relation to its subject, whereas a photograph stands 
in a merely causal relation to its subject.iii Many philosophers take issue with 
this rigid opposition but there is no need to pursue this debate here. 
Keeping in mind that Scruton is specifically concerned with the logical 
fictions of ‘ideal painting’ and ‘ideal photograph’; for his account, the 
dichotomy made in terms of ‘intentional vs. causal’ is straightforwardly 
definitive. 
 
In characterizing the relation between the ideal photograph and its 
subject, one is characterizing not an intention but a causal process, 
and while there is, as a rule, an intentional act involved, this is not an 
essential part of the photographic relation. (‘Photography and 
Representation’, p.121) 
 
 Of course it is not necessary to define the subject of a photograph in 
terms of this causal process, for the subject could be identified in 
some other way. But the fact remains that when we say that x is a 
photograph of y we are referring to this causal relation, and it is in 
terms of the causal relation that the subject of the photograph is 
normally understood. Let us at least say that the subject is so defined 
for my logical ideal of photography: that premise is all that my 
argument requires. (‘Photography and Representation’, p.131) 
 
Nonetheless, if we examine his account of an ideal photograph, we find that 
his definition is flawed and must be revised or rejected. In the rest of this 
section, I argue that Scruton is wrong to claim that an ideal photograph stands in 
a merely causal relation to its subject. He is not wrong to specify that an ideal 
photograph comes about through a process that is ‘merely causal’; but, once 
he has done so, he is wrong to talk about it having a ‘subject’. As I shall 
demonstrate, he employs this spurious terminology only because he 
  
equivocates between the ‘subject’ of a painting and the ‘subject’ of a 
photograph. 
 The equivocation first features in the opening move of Scruton’s 
argument. He starts by noting that: 
 
A photograph has in common with a painting the property by which 
the painting represents the world, the property of sharing, in some 
sense, the appearance of its subject (‘Photography and 
Representation’ p.119). 
 
By this, Scruton means that the material object of sight has visual properties 
which lead the spectator to see the subject in the picture, without leading the 
spectator to think that the picture is the subject. Scruton claims that, as 
pictures, photographs and paintings share this much and, in this minimal 
sense, both can be called ‘representational’. However, even if a painting and 
a photograph were to have exactly the same representational subject – 
imagine a painter and a photographer working side-by-side in front of a 
waterfall – Scruton will go on to say that only the painting counts as 
representational art. He draws the distinction between the two categories by 
arguing that the medium of painting makes it possible for our interest in a 
painting to be an interest in the representation, not just an interest in the 
represented subject. By contrast, the medium of photography cannot 
achieve this extra step: there can be no interest in the representation over 
and above an interest in the represented subject. For Scruton, this entails 
that only painting is a representational art.iv 
According to Scruton, if we are to take interest in a representation, it 
is not enough simply to identify the subject, or notice properties of the 
subject; rather we must attend to a particular way of seeing the subject – a 
way of seeing the subject made possible only through recognising the artist’s 
intentional use of the medium. It is not enough to see that the represented 
subject is a waterfall; we must also be able to grasp the artist’s thoughts 
about the waterfall.v In grasping those thoughts, we take an interest in the 
way that the thoughts are made perceptible to us through the medium and 
this is how the medium creates an interest in the representation itself that is 
separate from our interest in the represented subject.   
The disparity between the medium of painting and the medium of 
photography rests on whether a medium can do more than merely establish 
a relation between a picture and its subject. Scruton writes that a painting 
stands in an intentional relation to its subject and, furthermore, that the 
medium of painting can be transparent to human intentions – it makes 
human intentions perceptible. In viewing the picture, we do not just see the 
represented subject; we are invited to make sense of the artist’s thoughts 
about the subject and, thus, to appreciate the role of the medium in 
conveying those thoughts. In contrast, a photograph stands in a merely 
  
causal relation to its subject and, furthermore, the medium of photography 
is not transparent to human intentions. In viewing the photograph we can 
recognise properties of the subject, insofar as it reproduces the appearance 
of the subject, but nothing in the medium can make the thoughts of the 
photographer perceptible to us. The medium is transparent only to the 
appearance of the represented subject.vi  
I can now elaborate my objection. Scruton takes it that, in his 
opening move, he has neutrally characterised the common ground between 
paintings and photographs – namely that there is a sense in which both 
types of picture are representations of their subject-matter.vii The principle 
that painting is an intentional medium, but photography is not, is supposed 
to be a factor that arrives after the common ground has been established 
and serves to separate these types of picture-making into distinct categories: 
the aesthetically significant category of genuine representation in the former 
case and ‘representation’ in name-only in the latter case. In fact, I suggest, 
the supposedly neutral characterisation of pictures, which leads to the idea 
that a photograph has a subject, is a framework that only makes sense for 
intentional objects. With painting, there is a reasonable route from the idea 
that the painting is a picture that represents a subject, to saying that it stands 
in an intentional relation to its subject. If we also start with the idea that the 
photograph is a picture that ‘represents’ a subject, then it apparently makes 
sense to explain that the photograph is related to its subject by a causal 
relation. If, instead, the starting point is genuinely the idea that the 
photographic relation is merely causal, then we would not find ourselves 
wondering how to explain any relation between the photograph and its 
‘subject’. This would be the same mistake as thinking that a line of debris 
washed up on a beach is a picture that stands in a relation to a subject: 
namely the tide.viii 
Unlike the tide-line on a beach, most photographs are deliberately 
produced. Scruton claims that the mere involvement of an intentional act is 
not an essential part of the photographic relation (p.121) and that deliberate 
creation of an image does not make the image itself a vehicle of 
representational thought (p.141). Both points are correct, but the fact that 
he appeals to a subject at all means that his account is not sufficiently strict. 
If an ideal photograph stands in an entirely causal relation to the 
photographed objects, then it is like a tide-line on a beach. If an ideal 
photograph has a subject, then, in some respect, the relation is not merely 
causal.     
In the following passage, Scruton indicates that the term ‘represents’ 
does not genuinely apply to photographs. My point is that he should be 
equally reticent about the term ‘subject’: 
 
The ideal photograph, as I mentioned earlier, stands in a causal 
relation to its subject and ‘represents’ its subject by reproducing its 
  
appearance. In understanding something as an ideal photograph, we 
understand it as exemplifying this causal process, a process which 
originates in the subject ‘represented’ and which has as its end point 
the production of a copy of an appearance (‘Photography and 
Representation’ p.130). 
  
I certainly agree with Scruton that there is a significant difference between 
‘painting of x’ and ‘photograph of x’. But we cannot establish the difference 
by assuming that each is a picture with a representational subject, then 
pointing to a difference in the way that each picture relates to its subject. If 
something is a painting of x, then x is the subject of that painting. If 
something is a photograph of x, then x is not (or at least, not necessarily) the 
subject of that photograph.  
Scruton is entitled to claim that a photograph stands in a merely 
causal relation to some particular group of real objects, but he goes further 
than that. He assumes that, necessarily, those objects are the subject of the 
photograph, a move which apparently licences him to say that a photograph 
stands in a merely causal relation to a subject. In the following passage we 
can see this assumption at work: 
 
 A photograph is caused by its subject, and causality is a material 
relation. Hence the subject of the photograph must exist, and if a 
photograph is of a man, there is some particular man of whom it is a 
photograph (‘The Photographic Surrogate’ p.174). 
 
Against Scruton, I propose that the objects causally involved in the 
production of a photograph are not, just in virtue of their role in the 
photographic process, the subject matter of the photograph. Rather, 
photographed objects are elements involved in the photographic process 
that constitute part of the causal provenance of a photograph. It is possible 
for those objects to be the subject, but it is also possible for something else 
to be the subject. It is even possible that the photograph has no subject at 
all.  
Consider an illustration: (fig.1). Ordinarily we might call this a picture 
of a toy horse on a wall; primarily because, in some sense, the image 
resembles the visual appearance of a toy horse on a wall. But resemblance, 
for now, is irrelevant.ix If we reflect strictly in terms of a causal relation, we 
are not entitled to assume that the toy horse (or any other photographed 
object) is the subject of the photograph. Even if numerous objects are 
similarly causally related to the photograph, this does not mean that a toy 
horse, wall, church, road, and lamp post, taken in combination, count as the 
subject of the photograph. Strictly, we should only assume that a toy horse, 
a wall, a road, a church, a lamp post (and many other objects) were elements 
in the photographic event that led to the final appearance of the 
  
photograph. But this is like saying that yellow ochre, a stiff-tipped sable 
brush and a palate knife were elements in the process that led to the final 
appearance of a particular painting. That these elements were part of the 
medium of production is not held to determine that they are the subject of 
the work. We would not insist that the painting must be a painting of yellow 
ochre and a stiff-tipped sable brush. Of course, the painting might, as it 
happens, be a painting of yellow ochre (think of Lichtenstein’s paintings of 
giant brushstrokes), but the subject matter is nonetheless independent of the 
medium. 
Central to Scruton’s account of the artistic merit of the medium is the 
principle that the subject of a painting need not be some particular, existing 
thing: the subject of a painting may be fictional. For Scruton, fictional 
competence is the most important feature of representational art.x By 
contrast, photography is held to be fictionally incompetent because the 
subject of a photograph is, necessarily, some particular thing that exists. On 
my account, Scruton is no longer entitled to draw a contrast along these 
lines. Although everything he says about the fictional competence of 
painting still stands, he is not in a position to insist on the literal truth of a 
photograph. Of course, this point does not serve as an argument to say that 
photography can be fictionally competent – only that Scruton is not entitled 
to his original claim. By saying that this photograph may have a subject 
other than one, or all, of the photographed objects, it may seem that I am 
smuggling in the idea that intentionality plays a role in the production of 
photographs. In fact I agree that a role for intentionality is essential if a 
photograph has a subject at all, and believe that establishing the role of 
intentionality will show that it is possible for photographs to have subjects 
other than the photographed objects. However, I have not attempted to 
justify these claims here. I am merely saying that, insofar as a photograph 
has a subject, then the subject is not determined solely by the causal relation. 
On my account it remains a possibility that a photograph does not have a 
subject at all. 
Scruton should, of course, view my ‘objection’ thus far as a welcome 
contribution to his argument. Although I may have revealed a flaw in his 
definition of the ‘ideal photograph’, everything I have said seems to confirm 
his view that a photograph is an unsuitable object for aesthetic interest. If, as 
seems possible, an ideal photograph might have no subject at all, then this 
might make the sceptical position even stronger. However, this turns out 
not to be true.  The separation of medium from subject matter, as we have 
seen, is an important consideration for Scruton: 
 
To understand art is to be familiar with the constraints imposed by 
the medium and to be able to separate that which is due to the 




If we are to judge photography in light of this demand, we need to be sure 
that we properly understand the medium.xi By regarding the photographed 
objects as subject-matter, it has been possible for Scruton to overlook their 
proper role as constituent elements in the photographic process. In sections 
3 and 4, I elaborate this claim and explain why it changes the scope of the 




The logical fiction of the ideal photograph is designed to capture ‘what is 
distinctive in the photographic relation and in our interest in it’ (p.120). 
Scruton believes that whenever we take an interest in a photograph, our 
viewing experience is overwhelmingly influenced by our knowledge that 
there is a (merely) causal relation between the photograph and its subject. As 
he puts it: 
 
 One’s attitude is made practical by the knowledge of the causal 
relation between photograph and object. (‘Photography and 
Representation’ p.131) 
 
 In looking at a photograph, therefore, we know that we see 
something which actually occurred, as it occurred. This fact 
dominates our response to the picture, which becomes in 
consequence transparent to its subject (‘The Photographic Surrogate’ 
p.175). 
 
For Scruton, awareness of the causal relation can never provide a positive 
basis for taking aesthetic interest in a photograph as representational art. He 
insists, rightly, that interest we take in an ideal photograph must be 
dominated by our knowledge of its merely causal provenance, but he is 
committed to the principle that such knowledge cannot make a positive 
contribution. We see this commitment in the following argument: 
 
By its very nature, photography can ‘represent’ only through 
resemblance. It is only because a photograph acts as a visual reminder 
of its subject that we are tempted to say that it represents its subject. 
If it were not for this resemblance, it would be impossible to see from 
the photograph how the subject appeared, except by means of 
scientific knowledge that would be irrelevant to any interest in the 




Consider (Fig. 2). We cannot understand what this is a photograph of purely 
by its visual appearance. Although some areas of the photograph share the 
appearance of recognisable objects, the long blur across the middle of the 
photograph does not. It is easy to imagine that more extreme examples 
would be completely unrecognisable. Scruton worries that ‘scientific 
knowledge’ might be thought to provide a means to identify the subject of a 
photograph and enable the viewer to take interest in its appearance, in cases 
where the visual properties of the photograph are not sufficient. He points 
out that using inferential reasoning as the basis for understanding a 
representational subject cannot be a worthy concept of representation: 
 
 Why not say that any causal relation which allows us to infer the 
nature of the cause from the properties of the effect provides us with 
a representation of the cause in the effect? Such a concept of 
representation would be uninteresting indeed (op. cit.) 
 
Scruton specifies that our interest in a represented subject must be interest 
in its visual properties – we must be presented with a way of seeing it, not 
merely a way of thinking about it – hence he must rule out the possibility 
that we could take interest in the subject by inferential reasoning. With this 
argument, Scruton pushes through a significant additional requirement that 
is not directly entailed by the causal relation: the ideal photograph must 
share a visual appearance with its subject. However, once he has established 
that there must be identity of appearance between photograph and subject, 
Scruton is able to argue that our interest in the ideal photograph cannot be 
separated from our interest in the appearance of the subject.xii 
By specifying that the ideal photograph must share visual appearance 
with its subject, Scruton deliberately rules out of consideration the broader 
category of photographs whose appearance does not present immediately 
recognisable photographed objects (e.g. Fig. 2). This firmly establishes a 
double standard: ‘the ideal painting has no particular need for an identity of 
appearance with its subject’ (p.124); but the ideal photograph must have 
identity of appearance with its subject: where ‘subject’ is, only and 
necessarily, the photographed objects. Scruton’s argument assumes that, in 
the absence of being able to visually identify the subject, the subject of a 
photograph could be established through knowledge of the causal process. 
My objection is that this rests on an assumption I have already contested: it 
is wrong to think that the causal relation determines the subject of a 
photograph.  
I believe that it is sometimes desirable to use ‘scientific knowledge’, 
or reasoning from the properties of an effect, to learn what a photograph is 
a photograph of and that learning what it is a photograph of can help us to 
appreciate the photographer’s intentional use of the medium. But this is 
because learning the things a photograph is a ‘photograph of’ does not 
  
reveal what things it is a ‘picture of’. In the case of Fig. 2, a viewer who 
knows that the image was produced by photographing a moving train may 
be in a position to infer that the blur effect must have been caused by a long 
exposure. This is quite different to concluding, as Scruton’s viewer must do, 
that the subject of the photograph must be a train.  
Scruton constructed the problem that justifies his additional 
requirement precisely because he is committed to claiming that the relation 
‘photograph of’ determines the subject. In doing so he misconstrues the 
potential relevance of understanding the causal process. Scientific 
knowledge does not tell us what is the represented ‘subject’ of a causal 
relation, otherwise, as mentioned above, this would imply that we could 
treat the tide as the representational ‘subject’ of the line of debris washed 
onto the shore. By assuming that the medium of photography determines 
the subject of a photograph by a causal relation, Scruton has overlooked the 
possibility that knowledge of the causal process grants us insight into the 
medium of a photograph, rather than its subject matter. The significance of 
this idea will become more apparent if I provide an alternative to set against 
the photographic medium as it appears in Scruton’s account. 
Throughout his discussion, Scruton chooses to work with an 
extremely minimal characterisation of the photographic medium. In fact, if 
his definition of the ideal photograph can be considered the whole story, 
then his notion of the medium is defined entirely in terms of two 
considerations: an ideal photograph has a causal relation to its subject and 
identity of appearance with its subject. For his purposes Scruton has no 
need to discriminate between different stages of the photographic process. 
On his account it makes no difference whether the recording medium is 
collodion on glass, celluloid film or an electronic sensor. Nor does anything 
hinge, for him, on whether the visual object is a paper print, transparent 
slide, or digital image.  
More importantly, I take it that Scruton shares a widely held 
misconception about the medium of photography: namely that everything in 
front of the camera apparatus constitutes subject matter and everything 
inside or involving the camera apparatus constitutes the photographic 
medium. This notion typically goes hand-in-hand with an over-simplified 
story of the photographic process:  
 
i) an event of some kind takes place in front of the camera 
(sometimes called the ‘pro-filmic event’) e.g. a bird flies in front of a 
waterfall;  
ii) the camera takes a photograph of the pro-filmic event;  
iii) copies of the photograph are printed;  
iv) the appearance of the photograph leads the viewer to learn about 
the appearance of the pro-filmic event.  
 
  
The main idea is that the photograph stands in a causal relation to what is 
called the ‘pro-filmic’ event and that there is equivalence between the 
appearance of the pro-filmic event and the appearance of the photograph. 
Against this over-simplified conception, I now offer an alternative way to 
understand the photographic process and use it to elucidate the peculiarly 




Photography is a relatively new topic for discussion in mainstream 
philosophy of art, and, to date, debate has been dominated by over-
simplified characterisations of photography and photographs. Sometimes 
‘the photograph’ is used interchangeably to stand for the material substance 
that underwent change on exposure to light, and also for the visual object 
that is offered for view. The fact that these may sometimes be one and the 
same object should not obscure our understanding that they represent quite 
different stages in a multi-stage process. In the following account, my aim is 
to elucidate the relevant complexity of the photographic process and to 
replace Scruton’s notion of the ‘ideal photograph’ with a clear notion of 
‘photograph’ worthy of debate in the philosophy of art and aesthetics. If we 
are to consider the potential for photographs to be art (representational or 
otherwise) we cannot start with the idea of an object that ‘stands in a causal 
relation to its subject and ‘represents’ that subject by reproducing its 
appearance’ (p.130). On my account, an object defined in these terms would 
not count as a photograph.      
To begin, I can disentangle some terms. By ‘photography’ I mean a 
group of practices that includes creating, storing and displaying 
photographs. By ‘photographic process’ I mean a distinctive multi-stage 
process that necessarily includes the occurrence of a photographic event and 
the material production of photographic images. By ‘photograph’ I mean a 
visual image whose relevant causal history necessarily includes a 
photographic event. The term that plays the vital role is ‘photographic 
event’ and I will spend some time elaborating this idea in detail. I leave on 
one side, for now, any reference to the ‘medium of photography’.  
As a preliminary to the photographic event, the photographic 
apparatus (henceforth ‘the camera’) is set up in the presence of some 
ordinary state of affairs.xiii Examples of such ordinary states of affairs might 
be a beach, with surf waves on the sand and clouds in the sky; a family 
group seated around a table; or a street where a toy horse is standing on a 
wall.  
The camera’s photosensitive surface can be thought of as a two-
dimensional area, a ‘screen’, though in fact it has depth (e.g. chemical layers, 
photon sensors). Light reaching the screen may be reflected off objects, 
emitted directly from light sources, or both. The light is usually directed 
  
through an aperture and by a series of lenses and mirrors. The light reaching 
the screen forms a ‘light image’ – a changeable visible array of light of 
different wavelengths. A light image of this kind is what we are able to view 
by standing inside a camera obscura. Properties of the light image, such as 
brightness and sharpness, are determined by the camera optics; a filter will 
allow only selected wavelengths to reach the screen. The size, shape and 
pattern of the array is determined by optics according to whether a wide or 
narrow cone of light reaches the screen, but also by the camera position in 
relation to the objects and light sources. 
 The light image is a visible object and is available for viewers to 
examine – it can appear indiscernible from a photograph that is viewed with 
the aid of a slide projector or electronic ‘data projector’.xiv Imagine a light 
image created by a camera obscura aimed at an open book. The light image 
could appear perfectly still and it would be possible to read the writing on 
the pages of the book, just the same as a projected photograph. But a light 
image is not a photograph because it changes in real time according to 
changes in the state of affairs. If the page is turned, or the light source is 
moved, the light image will change. The properties a light image shares with 
photographs are not enough to put it in the same category as photographs. 
Rather, in Scruton’s sense, it is in broadly the same category as mirror 
images and the ‘image’ produced by holding up an empty frame. And that is 
my whole point. A light image may be focussed to visually resemble the 
appearance of a scene (to human eyes) and stands in a merely causal relation 
to that scene. I believe that Scruton’s ideal photograph is nothing more than 
an image of this kind.     
 Photographs (along with television and cinema) are in a different 
category because they have a distinctive causal history: one that requires a 
particular kind of event. The formation of a light image is a necessary stage, 
but it is not, by itself, a photograph. All of the preliminary stages described 
could have taken place and yet it would still not be possible for a 
photograph to be produced. The crucial stage of the relevant causal chain is 
the photographic event – the recording of the light image.  
A photographic event occurs when a photosensitive surface is 
exposed to the light and a recording of the light image takes place. The 
photographic event is the recording of the light image. It is important to recognise 
that in this description ‘a recording’ is not the same as ‘a record’. The record 
(an object such as a negative) is the result of the recording process. I 
emphasise this point in order to stress that the photographic event is not 
itself a photograph. Indeed, even when the photographic event is complete, 
the result is not necessarily immediately a photograph. The record left by 
recording the light image is not necessarily a visual image. It may have to 
undergo further processes to fix and develop the recording material before a 
visual image is produced.xv  The fact that, ordinarily, these processes are 
  
automated in modern cameras, should not lead us to overlook the 
significance they have as distinct stages in a complex process.  
In general, the duration of the photographic event corresponds to the 
period of time the photosensitive surface is exposed to light (misleadingly 
this is often called the exposure time ‘of the photograph’).xvi Different 
lengths of exposure time will produce significantly different records. Any 
photosensitive surface responds to light within certain thresholds: too little 
time (underexposure) will mean that little, if any, of the light image gets 
recorded, too much time (overexposure) will mean that the recording will be 
continually overwritten until all detail is lost. But if the light image is moving 
rather than static, exposure time determines more than just the total amount 
of light; it also determines the distribution pattern: a brief exposure time will 
limit how much the light image moves in relation to the screen during the 
recording process; a long exposure time will allow considerable movement. 
Movement of the light image during the photographic event can be caused 
by the motion of objects, the light source, or the camera itself. Hence the 
effects visible in Fig. 2 are not effects that could be seen in a light image – 
they are only possible as the consequence of a photographic event. 
Consider, then, that many factors determine the appearance of the 
light image and many further factors determine how properties of the light 
image are recorded – together these factors constitute the photographic 
event. It is a highly distinctive phenomenon and, crucially, the objects and 
light sources along with the photographic apparatus are all ineliminable 
elements of one and the same event - the photographic event.  
This is far from being the end of the story; in fact it is just the 
beginning. The photographic event is the definitive event in the causal 
production of a photograph. Recall the over-simplified story of the causal 
history at the end of section 3. Alongside that, I now offer an alternative 
account:  
 
i) A light image is formed, using objects and light sources in an 
ordinary state of affairs. 
ii) A photographic event occurs. No photograph yet exists.  
iii) The information recorded and stored undergoes a process to 
create a visual image (the photograph) or several such images. 
iv) The appearance of the photograph leads the viewer to learn about 
the photographic event. 
 
Notice, however, that the appearance of the photograph does not lead the 
viewer to learn about the appearance of the photographic event. The 
photographic event does not have relevant visual properties – it is not a 
visual event.xvii  This contrasts significantly with any version of the original 
causal story which is concerned to establish that the photograph shares an 
appearance with the pro-filmic event.  
  
Information recorded during the photographic event can be 
processed in different ways to result in any number of images – even ones 
with very different material properties. These photographs are not unified 
by sharing visual resemblance with and a causal relation to a ‘pro-filmic 
event’. Nor should we think that they are copies of ‘the original photograph’ 
that was taken, because there exists none such ‘photograph’. Rather they 
share in common a causal relation to one and the same photographic event. 
The photographic event is not, itself, a photograph. The final step in the 
multi-stage photographic process is the creation of the visual image and in 
this step there is further potential for a variety of factors to significantly 
affect the appearance of the final image. A photograph printed on 
cibachrome paper will have very different visual properties to a photograph 
installed on a light-box. A wallet-sized photograph will differ in its impact to 
a photograph projected onto the front of a building. These can be called 
copies of the same photograph precisely insofar as they have a causal history to 
the same photographic event – but the experience for the viewer of each 
may dramatically differ and, importantly, be influenced by knowledge of the 
material factors involved in production.  
My overall message is that appreciating a photograph qua photograph 
requires understanding that it has a distinctive causal provenance: to 
appreciate that its visual properties are causally dependent on properties of 
objects and light sources that went into creating the light image, factors 
involved in the photographic event and further material characteristics 
gained during its processing into a visual object. 
My reader should be quick to point out that the stages I have 
described can happen entirely by natural processes: strong sunlight, over 
time, may bleach a wooden panel, leaving the pattern of an overlaid fabric 
marked in dark relief. Is this a photograph? Yes, certainly; and an example 
of this kind is relevantly similar to the tide-line of debris left on a beach. 
Importantly, if we ask what it is a ‘photograph of’, we should properly say 
that it is just as much a photograph of the sunlight as a photograph of the 
fabric pattern. ‘Photograph of’ picks out a causal relation to the objects and 
light sources that were causally responsible for the light image. Being a 
photograph of these things does not entail visual resemblance. Most 
importantly, even when the photographic process causes visual resemblance, 
this does not suffice to make the photograph a picture. If a process causes 
an image to visually resemble the objects and sources causally responsible 
for its appearance, this does not mean that the image has a subject. 
The question of photography as a representational art should be 
reopened. Scruton talked about the ‘medium’ of photography and I have 
said little about this in my own account. We need to understand the 
photographic process if we want to understand its potential as a medium for 
art, or other purposes. Scruton argued, wrongly, that the medium necessarily 
constrains the subject matter of photographs. I argue that the medium 
  
consists of highly distinctive materials and processes: objects and light 
sources that contribute to the creation of the light image and are included in 
the photographic event. The photographic image stands in a merely causal 
relation to those objects, but this does not entail that they must be the 
subject of our interest when we view a photograph. There is a merely causal 
relation when a brush transfers paint to the canvas, but we don’t insist that, 
for that reason, our interest in paintings is an interest in paintbrushes. The 
photographic event is central to the medium of photography and with open 
minds we should investigate the idea that this distinctive causal 
phenomenon – just like the brushstroke – can be mastered and creatively 
exploited by skilled artists. Considering, anew, whether photography may be 
a medium that is transparent to human intentionality, we can ask whether 
some photographs are pictures and, of those pictures, (including some with 
fictional subjects) some are masterpieces that sustain aesthetic interest as 
representational art. If a photograph represents a subject, it does so because 
it stands in an intentional relation to the subject – but the causal relation 
places no constraints on what a photograph may depict. Understanding this 
should be the first step towards investigating the question of photography as 
a representational art.  
I think it is possible to establish that many photographs are truly 
remarkable works of art and that the experience of viewing them demands 
and rewards a sophisticated imaginative response; but I will defend this view 
elsewhere. I have offered the present account to demonstrate that when we 
ask the question what it is to take an interest in a photograph qua 
photograph, we must work with a proper understanding of photography, 




I have argued that Scruton’s Sceptical argument is flawed in two significant 
respects: he is not entitled to the idea that an ideal photograph has a subject 
and he is not entitled to the restriction he places on how we might take an 
interest in the ideal photograph: namely that we may only take interest in 
photographs that visually resemble the photographed objects. Both of these 
flaws share, as a root, Scruton’s underestimation of the causal provenance of 
photographs and the extent to which the nature of the photographic process 
makes photography a distinctive ‘medium’. My own suggestions are, if 
anything, more extreme than Scruton’s original position: it is possible that a 
photograph does not have a subject at all and the interest we take in 
photographs must involve an appreciation of their causal provenance. An 
important consequence is that when we re-open the question of 
photographs as representational art, we must include photographs which do 
not share their visual appearance with photographed objects.  
  
 My positive account does not meet the rich and demanding theory of 
aesthetic understanding that Scruton offers in his wider work – nor does it 
attempt to do so. If anything, the account I have offered is likely to give 
Scruton fresh reasons to want to see photography excluded from the 
pantheon of art. But, if my account carries force, it will convince him that he 




                                                 
i I take Scruton to be implicitly committed to the claim that photography is a genuine art 
form only if it is a representational art form; and to the strong thesis that photography is 
not a genuine art form at all. One remark in ‘The Photographic Surrogate’ seems to 
imply a weaker thesis: ‘[photography] may be an art, but, if so, it is not an art of 
depiction’ (p.174), which would mean that he does not have that commitment. However, 
in context, the remark seems to be playing a dialectical role and the overwhelming import 
of Scruton’s essays points to a stronger thesis – albeit unstated. The epigraph bears out 
this interpretation.  
ii In sections 2 and 3, I follow Scruton by talking about the ‘medium’ of photography. In 
section 4, I change to talking about the photographic process.   
iii According to Scruton, a ‘merely causal’ relation is one ‘that [is] not characterized in terms 
of any thought, intention, or other mental act’ (‘Photography and Representation’ p.121). 
Unless otherwise indicated, essays appear in Roger Scruton, The Aesthetic Understanding: 
Essays in the Philosophy of Art and Culture, (South Bend, Indiana: St Augustine’s Press, 1983, 
1998). 
iv Scruton’s category of representational art would extend to any form of depiction where 
the picture stands in an intentional relation to its subject matter – including drawing, 
etching and print-making.  
v A representational work of art must express thoughts about its subject and an interest 
in the work should involve an understanding of those thoughts (‘Representation in 
Music’ p.72). 
vi ‘One might say that the medium in photography has lost all importance: it can present 
us with what we see, but it cannot tell us how to see it’ (‘Photography and 
Representation’ p.133). 
vii He reiterates this notion as follows: ‘in both cases, it seems, the important part of 
representation lies in the fact that the spectator can see the subject in the picture’ 
(‘Photography and Representation’ p.121). 
viii This is true even when the shape of the tide-line visually resembles the shape of the 
waves. 
ix Scruton specifies visual resemblance in his definition of the ideal photograph, but not 
as an immediate consequence of the causal process. I criticise his separate justification in 
section 3. 
x ‘For unless it were possible to represent imaginary things, representation could hardly 
be very important to us. It is important because it enables the presentation of scenes and 
characters toward which we have only contemplative attitudes: scenes and characters 
which, being unreal, allow our practical natures to remain unengaged’ (‘Photography and 
Representation’ p.127). ‘Fictional representation is not merely an important form of 
representational art but in fact the primary form of it, the form through which the 
aesthetic understanding finds its principal mode of expression’ (Ibid. p.132). 
  
                                                                                                                                            
xi In ‘Representation as Music’, Scruton writes ‘Representation requires a medium, and is 
understood only when the distinction between subject and medium has been recognized’ 
(p.71). 
xii ‘The photograph is transparent to its subject, and if it holds our interest it does so 
because it acts as a surrogate for the thing which it shows’ (‘Photography and 
Representation’ p.134). 
xiii By using ‘camera’ as shorthand for photographic apparatus I wish to avoid confusion 
by noting that photographic apparatus comes in a huge range of forms, including the 
‘camera-less’ apparatus used for creating photograms. On my account a photogram 
counts as a photograph.   
xiv This is true of general cases. I don’t want to rule out the idea that an x-ray is a species 
of light image; or to exclude the case of light images that are too faint or too small for 
detection by ordinary sighted human beings.  
xv When the silver salts on a photosensitive film surface react to light, this change leaves a 
record. The photographic event ends when the photosensitive surface ceases to be 
exposed to a light image. At this point, when dealing with photographic film, the record 
is not permanent (further exposure to light will distort the record). The record is 
stabilised by chemical fixatives, then chemically developed to produce a visible image. In 
the case of digital cameras, the electric charge produced by the sensor reacting to light 
becomes a stable record only when digitised data from the electronic sensor is ‘saved’ as 
a coded file. A further process is required to turn the file into a visible image. 
xvi Unusual cases include astronomical photography, where what appears to be a single 
photograph is the end result of multiple exposure times; and strip-technique 
photography, where a single exposure time is recorded across multiple sections of a 
photosensitive area.  
xvii The photosensitive surface may undergo a visible change during the recording 
process, but it is the event of the recording that is relevant – not any appearance. 
xviii My thanks to the audience of the Durham conference in honour of Roger Scruton 
and my colleagues on the AHRC Project Aesthetics After Photography. I am grateful for 
written comments from Diarmuid Costello, Ian Ground, Robert Hopkins, Lambert 
Wiesing and David Davies. 
